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RECENT CASES.
BAILMENT-LIABILITY OF INN-KEEPER-TRUNK SENT IN ADVANCE o1
GUEsT-The plaintiff forwarded his trunk to a hotel twelve days before he
was to come himself. The trunk was placed in a store-room and there
opened and looted before his arrival. Held: The relation of inn-keeper and
guest did not arise until the actual arrival of the owner of the trunk at the
hotel. Until then the proprietor of the hotel was merely a gratuitous bailee
and was not liable except for gross carelessness. Hirsch v. Anderson Hotel
Co., 58 Pa. Super. Ct. 387 (914).
The rule seems clear that one who does not procure accommodations is
not a guest and the liability for the goods of one not a guest is that of a
gratuitous bailee. So, where one turned his luggage over to hotel porter
intending later to secure accommodations at the hotel, but afterwards changed
his mind anu the luggage was stolen before he called for it. Tulane Hotel
Co. v. Holohan, 112 Tenn. 214 (i9o3) ; where a guest at an inn paid his bill
in the morning, had his name stricken from the register, purposely to relieve
himself from liability as a guest during a short absence, even though intend-
ing to return at night. Miller v. Peeples, 6o Miss. 81g (1883); Strauss v.
County Hotel and Wine Co., 49 L T. Rep. (N. S.) 6ot (Eng. 1883).
The responsibility of the inn-keeper to his guest is similar to that of a
common carrier to its passenger. So where plaintiff checked his baggage to a
certain point but himself stopped over night at an intermediate 'station it
was held that the relation of passenger and carrier had ceased and defendant
was merely a warehouseman and not liable for the loss of the baggage
except in the event of gross negligence. Merritt v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.,
49 Pa. Super. Ct. 219 (IgI). It is not necessary that the arrival of the
guest and his luggage at the hotel be absolutely contemporaneous; where
baggage is delivered to the inn-keeper as the baggage of an intended guest
who, within a reasonable time thereafter actually becomes a guest, the respon-
sibility of the inn-keeper for the safe-keeping of the baggage relates 9ack
to the time when baggage was delivered. Eden v. Drey, 75 I1. App. io2
(r897). So where an express company delivered a trunk, which disappeared
before the owners' arrival, forty-five minutes later, the hotel-keeper was
liable. Flint v. Illinois Hotel Co., 149 Ill. App. 4o4 (igog).
BILLS AND NOmS-INToXICATiON OF MAxm-AFIRMANcE--The defend-
ant, while intoxicated, executed a promissory note for a valid, pre-existing
debt. He recognized the note as a binding obligation for five years after
its execution and, during that time, made numerous promises to pay it. In
an action upon the note. the defendant contended that the note was invalid
because signed while he was intoxicated. Held: The ratification of the note
precluded him from asserting this defence. Matz v. Martinson, 149 N. W.
Rep. 37 (Minn. i9 or4).The weight of authority is that a party may plead his intoxication in
avoidance of a contract. There is some difference of opinion as to what
degree the intoxication must reach in order to render the contract voidable
but it, is generally not sufficient that the party was under mere "undue excite-
ment' from liquor but he must be so far deprived of his reason and under-
standing as to render him incapable of understanding the character and
consequence of his act. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Meyers, 1i
N. W. Rep. 602 (Neb. io7); Dewitt v. Bowers, 18.3 S. W. Rep. 1147 (Tex.
x911). The modern view is that a contract, although voidable, by reason of
the intoxication of one of the parties, is not void, and, consequently, may be
ratified when the party becomes sober, and, if so ratified, will be enforced.
Matthews v. Baxter. L. R. 8 Exch. 132 01873); Johnson v. Harmon, 94 U. S.
371 (1876) ; Snead v. Scott. 62 So. Rep. 36 (Ala. 1913). This is true though
the intoxication was voluntary and not procured by the circumvention of the
other party. Fowler v. Meadow Brook Water. Co., 2o8 Pa. 473 (1904).
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Where a person seeks to repudiate a contract upon the ground that when
he made it he was intoxicated, he must show not only that he was incapaci-
tated by intoxication, but also that he rescinded the agreement within a rea-
sonable time after his recovery, and placed the other party in statu quo, by
returning the consideration received. Fowler v. Meadow Brook Water Co.,
supra.; Joest v. Villiams, 42 Ind. 565 (1873). Thus, if a party executes a
promissory note while he is intoxicated, but after becoming sober ratifies
the transaction by keeping the consideration which he received for the note,
lie cannot afterward avoid the note. Smith v. Williamson, 8 Utah, 219
(1892). The defence of drunkenness of the maker of a negotiable note is
not available against the same in the hands of a bona fide holder for value.
McSparran v. Neeley, 9x Pa. 17 (1879); Smith v. Williamson, supra. See
also "Intoxication as a Defence to an Express Contract," 62 U. OF P. L. R. 34.
CARRIEs-LIMITED LIAutau ,-BAcaAOE-Carriers of passengers by rea-
sonable regulations brought to the knowledge of the passenger, may be pro-
tected against liability as insurers for baggage to a specified value, except
when paid additional compensation proportional to the risk, and $ioo is a
reasonable amount in value above which an additional charge may be made.
Zetler v. Tonopah & Goldfield R. Co., 14,3 Pac. Rep. li9 (Nev. 1914).
As a general rule in the carriage of the passenger's baggage the carrier
incurs the full responsibility of the common carrier of goods, and becomes
insurer of its safety against every accident which is not the act of God or of
the public enemy or the fault of the shipper himself. Railroad Co. v. Knight,
58 N. J. L 287 (x895); Saunders v. Ry., 128 Fed. z5 (10o4). A common
carrier may by contract with the passenger limit his liability in regard to
baggage the same as he may to freight. Steers v. Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. i
(1874). and the same rules apply. The fundamental rule is that he cannot
contract for exemption from liability for losses caused by his own negligence
or the negligence of his servants. Severpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co.,
129 U. S. 397 (z889); Armstrong v. Express Co., 159 Pa. 640 (1894); Cox V.
Rd., 17o Mass. 129 (1898). Some jurisdictions allow total exemption, Wabash
Rd. Co. v. Brown, 152 Ill. 484 (1894). Nevertheless, even where negligence
cannot be exempted the carrier can contract so as not to be liable over a
specified amount for losses even though they are caused by his negligence.
Hart v. P. R. R., 112 U. S. 331 (1884); Boston & Maine Rd. v. Hooker, 233
U. S. 97 (1o4) ; Hood Co. v. American, etc., Co., 77 N. E. Rep. 638 (Mass.
i9o6) ; Hughes v. P. R. R.. 202 Pa. 222, contra (19o2) ; and thus the carrier
practically escapes ninety-uine per cent. of his negligence, but not it all. The
theory of the rule is that the passenger has opportunity to declare the value
of his baggage and if it exceeds the amount that will be carried free, he
must pay an additional charge, for the carrier's free rate was given merely
for a small risk and the greater risk can be obtained by paying more for it.
So if the passenger accepts the free rate he cannot enforce any but the low
liability no matter what the real value of the goods which were lost might be.
Hart v. Railroad, supra. In order to make this contract binding on the pas-
senger he must have had the free opportunity of choosing to send his baggage
under the common law liability and being charged in addition, or to accept
the carrier's offer to carry it free on his ticket providing the liability in case
of loss or damage shall not exceed a certain amount, which amount is called
the agreed value of the baggage. Graves v. Express Co., 176 Mass. 28o
(x0oo); U. S. Express Co. v. Joyce. 72 N. E. Rep. 865 (tqo4). These rules
have been carried to such an extent that if a passenger checks his baggage
to his destination on his ticket with nothing more, and in the carrier's tariff
it is provided that it shall not be liable for more than $too for baggage so
checked, even though the passenger knew nothing of such rules or tariff, he
can only recover $oo for the loss of his baggage no matter what might have
been its real value. Boston & Maine Rd. v. Hooker. 233 U. S. 97 (1914). So
it is clear that the leading case is well within the prevailing rules.
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CONTRACTS-ILLFGALITY-RELU'F-One who had been induced by fraudu-
lent representations to purchase stock in a corporation, and had been prom-
ised by the manager and holder of the majority of the stock, as additional
consideration, that he would be elected secretary and attorney of the company,
brought suit to compel the reconveyance of title to land which he had con-
veyed in payment of the stock. Held: Though the contract was illegal as
looking to the control of the company, and though the parties were equally
guilty, yet in view of public policy requiring fraudulent promoting schemes to
be thwarted, equity will grant relief to a party induced to contract by fraud.
Gilchrist v. Hatch, io6 N. E. Rep. 6o.4 (Ind. 1914).
The opinion in this case contains an excellent summary of the law relating
to the point in issue. As a general rule. the law will leave all equally guilty
of an illegal or immoral transaction where it finds them, and will not lend
its aid either to enforce the contract while executory or to rescind it and
recover the consideration parted with when executed. Cottonwood v. Austin,
i. 8 Ala. ii7 (9o8) ; Klein v. Bank. i3o N. Y. Supp. 4.36 (igix). There are,
however, four exceptions to this rule. One is where recovery is provided for
by statute; e. g., the many statutes allowing one who has paid his losses
under a wager to recover the same. Another exception is where some fraud,
duress, oppression, or undue influence is practiced by one party upon the
other so that the guilt of the latter is subordinate to that of the former. In
this case the parties are not considered in pari delicto. McDonald v. Smith,
139 Mich. 211 (19o5); Stewart v. Wright, 147 Fed. Rep. 321 (i96). Thirdly,
one may be granted relief, though in pari delicto, when the public interest
will be better promoted by granting than by denying relief; and in such cases
the rule must yield to public policy. Auxer v. Llewellyn, T42 IlL. App. 265
(1908). This was the main ground for the decision in the principal case,
though the element of the preceding exception, i:.., fraud by one party upon
the other, also entered into it. Lastly, if the illegal purpose of the contract
has not yet been accomplished, the law allows a party to repudiate the
illegal contract and recover what he has parted with thereunder. This is
the doctrine of locus poenitentiae. Ware v. Spinney, 76 Kans. 289 (I9o7);
Leadbetter v. Hawley, 59 Ore. 422 (1g1).
CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATIOnIn consideration of the transfer
for value of certain patent rights relating to cameras from the plaintiff to the
defendant, the defendant promised to sell cameras manufactured under those
letters patent to the plaintiff at a certain price. Subsequently the defendant
refused to furnish cameras. Held: The contract is not invalid for want of
mutuality because the plaintiff did not obligate himself to purchase. Conley
Camera Co. v. Multiscope Film Co., 216 Fed. Rep. 892 (1914).
The general rule in the case of executory contracts is that in the absence
of mutuality of obligation, they are unenforceable. Lester v. Jewett, i2
Barb. 502 (N. Y. 1849). In the case of option contracts, however, a different
view prevails and if the option is granted for good consideration it is en-
forceable. Hoogendorn v. Daniel, 178 Fed. Rep. 765 (xgxo). The reason
given in Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. I (i89o), and approved in the principal
case is that "when a party has received payment for a privilege, he cannot
resist the enforcement of that privilege on the mere ground that he cannot
compel the other party to continue its enjoyment!' In cases where the con-
sideration for the option is not so apparent, the modem trend of authority in
three classes of cases is interesting. (z) Contracts to supply such material as
one may need in his business for a specified time are, by weight of authority,
held mutual and binding, where the nature of the purchaser's business makes
the quantity necessary subject to a reasonably accurate estimate. Stuart v.
Home. Tel. Co., 16i Mich. 123 (i9io); and acceptance of the offer binds the
purchaser to conduct his business in the future so as to need substantially
the same amount of materials as in the past. Wells v. Alexandre, 13O N. Y.
642 (189i). Several jurisdictions, however, hold such contracts invalid even
Where the quantity needed can be estimated with approximate accuracy. Hoff-
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man v. Maffioli. xo4 Wis. 630 (1899). In Cold Blast Co. v. Kansas City Bolt
CO., 114 Fed. Rep. 77 (1902), the test laid down was whether or not the
quantity depended upon the will, wish, or want of one of the parties or was
ascertainable with reasonable accuracy. Parks v. Boyd Co., 91 AtL Rep. 581
(Md. 1914). (2) In cases of contracts between automobile makers and their
dealers where the dealer is bound to sell a certain number of automobiles
and the maker is given an option whether or not to deliver any at all, the
decisions are not in accord. It has been held void for want of mutuality,
Goodyear v. Koehler Sporting Goods Co., 143 N. Y. Supp. io46 (1913) , but
Gile v. Interstate Motor Car Co., 145 N. W. Rep. 732 (N. D. 1914), took the
opposite view and held a substantially similar contract enforceable. The
latter decision may possibly be reconciled on another ground, that an inde-
pendent consideration was present. See 62 U. of P. L R. 633. (3) In the
third class of cases dealing with the much discussed option clause in baseball
contracts, wherein the retention of the player's services for the succeeding
year is optional with the club owners, while they at the same time have the
power to terminate the contract on ten days' notice to the player, has been
held lacking in mutuality and unenforceable in equity in so far as it bound the
player to renew. Am. League Club of Chicago v. Chase, 149 N. Y. Supp.
6 (1914); Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, x76 Fed. Rep. 782 (z9o2);
\eegham v. Killefer, 215 Fed. Rep. 168 (1914); but the contrary was held
in Phila. v. Lajoie, 2o2 Pa. 210 (19o2).
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRALDs-PROMISE tO PAY DE13r or ANoTnEv-
MEcHANic's LIEN-A person holding a recorded mortgage on a building in
course of construction, and who still retained in his possession a large por-
tion of the mortgage money, agreed orally to pay the claim of a sub-
contractor, if he would not file a mechanic's lien, which the latter had a right
to file. Held: The promise is not within the provisions of the Statutes of
Frauds and Perjuries of 1855, P. L 3o8. Silberstein v. Bernstein, 58 Pa.
Super. Ct. 375 (1914).
As the court pointed out in this case there were two reasons why the
statute did not apply to the facts: (i) The rule in Pennsylvania following
that laid down in Emerson v. Slater. 6.3 U. S. 28 (1859) is that: "Whenever
the main object of the promisor is not to answer for the debt of another,
but to subserve some business or pecuniary purpose of his own, involving
either benefit to himself or damage to tile other party, his promise is not
within the statute, although it may be in form a promise to answer for the
debt of another, and although the performance may incidentally have the
effect of extinguishing that debt." Webber & Co. v. Bishop, 12 Pa. Super.
Ct. 5i (1899); Klein v. Rand, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 263 (iog8) ; Bailey v. Mar-
shall. 174 Pa. 602 (1896). (2) A promise to pay the debt of another is not
within the Statute of Frauds, even though the liability of the original debtor
continues if the promisor has received a fund pledged, set apart or held for
the payment of the debt. Maule v. Bucknell, 5o Pa. 39, 52 (t865) ; Burns v.
Mazar, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 436 (1896). On this point there is considerable dif-
ference of judicial opinion, some jurisdictions holding that only- where the
original debtor is released at the time of the new promise the statute does
not apply. O'Connell v. Mt. Holyoke College, 174 Mass. Six (1899); Miles
v. Driscoll, 2o Mass. 318 (i909); Engleby v. Harvey, 93 Va. 440 (186).
However, where the principal object is to secure benefit to the pronusor
the general rule is that the statute does not apply although the original debtor
is not released. It has been held that where the promisor agrees to relin-
quish a lien on property in which the promisee has an interest that the promise
does not have to be in writing, Small v. Schaeffer, 24 Md. r43 (1895); Weisel
v. Spruce, 59 Wis. 301 (1884); Luark v. Malone, 34 Ind. 344 (1870), and on
principle there seems to be no distinction between these cases and the prin-
cipal case. In the case of Boeff v. Rosenthal, 78 N. Y. Supp. zro8 (19o2),
where the facts were practically identical, the court reached the same coq-
clusion,
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CRIMINAL LAW-zisCONDUcT OF JURY-Under a prosecution for selling
beer contrary to the statute, three bottles of the intoxicant were introduced
in evidence and sent to the jury room as exhibits. When the jury returned
to the court room, the three bottles were found in the jury room empty.
Held: In sampling the contents of the bottles the jury clearly violated the
law as they had no right to resort to any such experiments in ascertaining
defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Applegate, 149 N. NV. Rep. 356 (N.
D. 1914).
Jurors in deciding the issues before them must content themselves with
the evidence adduced in the court room and may not indulge in experimenta-
tion on their own account; where defendant was accused of homicide, and his
clothing offered in evidence showing no powder marks, two jurors experi-
mented with a rifle outside of the court room in order to ascertain at what
distance powder marks would be left upon clothing and a new trial was
granted. People. v. Conkling. iii Cal. 627 (1896); so where the jury"sampled" some ice on defendant's ice wagon to ascertain whether it was
good ice or not. Consolidated Ice Machine Co. v. Trenton Hygelan Ice Co,
57 Fed. Rep. 8)8 (1893); so in a prosecution under the local option laws,
jurors tested exhibits to ascertain whether intoxicating or not, Galloway v.
State. ,42 Tex. Cr. R. 380 (19oo); State v. Baker. 67 Wash. 595 (1912). But
it was not error to permit the jury to take a bottle of alcohol alleged to
have been sold to prosecutrix and smell its contents. Thomson V. State, z6o
S. W. Rep. 685 (Tex. 1913).
The parties being entitled to calm, dispassionate deliberations on the
part of the jury, a new trial will be granted if the jury consume any
spirituous liquors during the discussions. State v. Bullard, 16 N. H. i39
(1844); Bank v. Fowler. I Cow. 502 (N. Y. 1827) ; People v. Douglass, 4
Cow. 36 (N. Y. 1825). Circulation of spirituous liquors with consent of both
parties is ground for reversal. Rose v. Smith, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 17 (1825);
similarly drinking of- intoxicants is absolute ground for new trial, Jones v.
State. 13 Tex. t68 (1854); Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496 (1871); Leighton v.
Sargent. 31 N. H. 114 (1855); Ryan v. Harrow, 27 Ia. 494 (186o); State v.
Bruce, 48 Ia. s30 0878). In some jurisdictions the drinking of stimulating
liquors merely raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant which
prosecution must relut affirmatively, Gamble Y. State, 44 Fla. 429 (19o2);
Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 432 (i895); Jones v. State, 68 Ga. 76o (i8b8); Dolan
v. State, 40 Ark. 454 (1883); State v. Madigan, 57 Minn. 426 (1894); State
v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 8oo (893).
Cmm:ixA LAw-PR.sUMPxpON OF INNoc NcE-IN sANx-Sanity being
the normal condition of the mind, its existence is to be presumed. The
burden of proof is on him who pleads insanity. Hence there can be no
presumption of innocence when killing without justification is proved and
defense is insanity. Com. v. Wheeler, 246 Pa. 528 (1914).
The general rule in the great majority of jurisdictions is that where
insanity is interposed as a defense to murder, it must be established by
affirmative proof as every person is presumed to be sane until the contrary
is proved. State v. De Rance, 34 La. Ann. z86 (1882); Kwell v. State, x39
Ala. t 09og). A few jurisdictions, however, hold that as "sound memory
and discretion," is as much an ingredient of murder as any other, it devolves
upon the state to show sanity beyond a reasonable doubt State v. Crawford,
ii Kan. 32 (873).
In those jurisdictions upholding the presumption of sanity, it is not
enough, in order to overthrow such a presumption, to raise a doubt as to
prisoner's sanity in the jury's mind. Lynch v. Com. 77 Pa. 213 (1894). The
evidence of insanity must be 'fairly" preponderating. Com. v. Molten, 23o
Pa. 399 (191), -ut an instruction that the evidence must be "clearly"
preponderating is erroneous. Coyle v. Com., too Pa. 573 (1882). But where
the doubt was created solely by the state's evidence, the defendant is entitled
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to an acquittal, MXfcDougal v. State, 88 Ind. 24 (i887). The state is not
called upon to offer evidence of sanity in the first instance, but may do so
in reply to the defendant's evidence of insanity, Com. v. Eddy, 73 Mass.
(7 Gray) 583 (856). Where defendant is a fugitive from a lunatic asylum
the burden rests on the state to show that he was restored to reason before
doing the killing, State v. Browshead. 3 Wkly. Law Bul. 187 (Ohio, 1878),
but the fact that defendant was subject to spells of insanity from time to
time does not raise a presumption of insanity so as to shift the burden of
proof to the state, Talbert v. State, 14o Ala. 96 (19o4); nor does a state of
chronic insanity cast upon the prosecution the burden of showing a lucid
interval at time of killing. State v. Palmer, I6x Mo. x52 (igos).
EvIDENCE-OTHER OrM SES-BRIBER,'-In the prosecution of a publie
officer for the solicitation of a bribe, evidence of another similar solicita-
tion was held admissible, but only to prove the specific intent charged in the
indictment. State v. Davis. xo6 N. E. Rep. 770 (Ohio, 1914).
It is well established that evidence of other offenses is inadmissible if
offered to prove that the accused is more likely to have committed the crime
for which he is on trial. Regina v. Oddy. 5 Cox C. C. 210 (Eng. 1851);
People v. Pettanza. 2o7 N. Y. 56o (1913). As an exception to this general
rule, it is equally well settled that evidence of collateral offenses is admissible,
on the trial of the main charge, to prove motive or intent. Clark v. People,
224 II. 5 (9o6) ; People v. Weinseiner, 102 N. Y. Supp. 579 (19o7). The
admissibility of other offenses in this class of cases is based upon the doc-
trine of chances and probabilities. The evidence is merely presumptive proof
of the intent. Rex v. Francis. 2 C. C. R. 128 (Eng. 1874). Where a specific
intent is required for conviction, the competency of the evidence of other
offenses is limited to the proof of the specific intent charged in the indict-
ment. Com. v. Eastman, x Cush. 216 (Mass. 1848); Corn. v. Sheppard, i
Allen, 575 (Mass. x86).
In accord with the decision of the principal case, it is generally held that
on the trial for the giving or the solicitation of a bribe, the intent of the
accused may be shown by similar acts committed at other times. Higgins v.
State, 157 Ind. 57 (toot); Carden v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. App. 545 (1911).
There have, however, been numerous deflections from this generally accepted
rnle. People v. Hurley, x26 Cal. 351 (1899); State v. Fitchette, 92 N. W.
Rep. r.27 (kMinn. 1902). These decisions have been severely criticized as
breeding defiance of the law and encouraging criminals in gambling on the
result of judicial quibbles. Wigmore's Evidence (ed. x904), vol. 1, §34.
E'IDExcE-PHYsxCAL ExAMI.ATIONs OF PF.RSON INJvED--A federal court
has no power to compel the plaintiff in an action of tort to submit to a
physical examination by disinterested physicians. Brace v. Central R. R.
of N. J.. 216 Fed. Rep. 718 (1914).
At the early common law no instance has been disclosed of any case
where, in a civil action for personal injuries, a physical examination of the
plaitiff has been compelled. The principal case, in refusing to order an
examination, followed the rule laid down in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bots-
ford, 141 U. S. 250 (189o), where the decision was based upon the sacred
right of every individual to control his own person fee from interference
and restraint. In that case there was a strong dissenting opinion. In Cam-
den Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172 (i899), such examination was ordered
under a local statute.
Among the state courts the great weight of authority favors the power.
The right in Pennsylvania is justified as being within the equitable powers
inherent in courts to regulate practice in the furtherance of justice. Hess
v. Ry. Co., 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 565 (1882); Dimenstein v. Riechelson, 34 W. N. C.
295 (Pa. 1893) ; Wanek v. City of Winona, 8o N. IV. Rep. 85i (Minn. 1899).
In Lane v. Northern Ry. Co., 21 Wash. 119 (1899), it was said that "courts
should not sacrifice justice to notions of delicacy." The power is denied in a
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few states. Richardson v. Nelson, 77 N. E. Rep. 583 (IlL i9o6). In several
states the power is given by statute. McGovern v. Hope, 42 Ad. Rep. 830
(N. J. 1899) ; Goldenberg v. Zirinsky, ioo N. Y. Supp. 251 (i9o6). According
to the better view the right to compel examination is not absolute but depends
upon the circumstances and is at the discretion of the court. Fullerton v.
Fordyce, 121 Mo. i (1894). See also 62 U. or P. IL R. aaf
EVIDENCE--PRESUMPTION-UNDUE IXFLUE-CE-A woman shortly before her
death made a new will in which she bequeathed a large part of her property
to a certain church and its rector. She had never met the rector until a
few weeks before her death and had not even known that there was such
a church as the church in question. There was no evidence of change of
feeling towards the contestant who was the legatee under the first will. It
appeared that the rector had been a frequent caller during the last illness,
leaving the testatrix under the impression that she was morally bound to
"do something" for the church and that he had had something to do with
employing the lawyer who drew the wilL Held: The case should have gone
to the jury with the instructions, that there was evidence of a fiduciary rela-
tion existing between testatrix and the rector, sufficient to raise a presump-
tion of undue influence on his part, which presumption he was bound to
overcome. In re Hartlerode's Estate, 148 N. W. Rep. 774 (Mich. 1914).
There are certain cases in which the law indulges in the presumption
that undue influence has been exercised which it is incumbent on the pro-
ponent of the will to disprove; as where a patient makes a will in favor
of his physician, Conklin v. Conklin, 165 Mich. 571 (i911), but see In re
Cornell's Estate, 43 App. Div. 241 (N. Y. 1899); a client in favor of his
attorney, Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 278 (Eng. i8oi); In re McMaster's Estate,
163 Mich. 210 (gio), but cf. In Re Hooker's Estate, 2o7 Pa. 2o3 (19o3);
or a sick person in favor of his priest or spiritual adviser, whether for his
own personal advantage, McPherson v. Byrne, 155 Mich. 338 (i9o8); Ross
v. Conway, 92 Cal. 632 (i892), or for the advantage of some interest of
which he is the representative, Ross v. Conway, .jupra, or where the will is
drawn in favor of one's confidential adviser and business associate. Rich-
mond's Appeal, 59 Conn. 226 (i89o). This presumption is, however, rebut-
table. In "e Sparks Will, 63 N. J. Eq. 242 (i902); Donovan v. Bromley,
113 Mich. 53 (£897). These cases are the cases of "fiduciary relationship"
so-called, into which, because of the existence of confidential relations be-
tween testators and legatees, the court will examine more closely than into
other cases on account of the ease with which such relationships can be
abused to the detriment of rightful heirs. The principal case is of this class
of case.
EV.IDExcE-REs GEsTAE-The exclamation of a boy four years of age that
"the bums killed Pa with a broomstick", which was made within thirty
seconds after a fatal assault in the boy's presence upon his father, is admis-
sible in evidence as part of the res geslae. State v. Lasecki, xo6 N. E- Rep.
66o (Ohio, 1914).
There are as many definitions of res gestae as there are works on evi-
dence, and possibly no part of the law of evidence is in greater confusion.
Elliott, in his Treatise on Evidence, voL 1, §36 (ed. £9o4), defines res gertae
as "declarations or acts which accompany and are a part of the transaction
in controversy, and tend to explain it,. such transaction itself being admis-
sible in evidence." But in this country at least, the courts seem inclined to
use the term as a broad and convenient cloak for admitting any evidence
which they wish to admit, but which cannot be brought in under any other
rule. However, whether strictly part of the res gestae or not, it is well set-
tled that spontaneous exclamations made in consequence of a sudden out-
ward occurrence causing excitement or shock are, in general, admissible.
R. v. Foster, 6 C. & P. 325 (Eng. 1834); Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wail 391
(U. S. 1869). The reason given for this in the principal case is that "the
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language proceeds from impulse, from the natural and necessary inpres-
sions made bv the acts of the parties in controversy, so that the human
mind in its helplessness or despair, or its natural and necessary anxiety, acts
under an impulse or a spontaneous influence that is a sort of echo or
reaction from the general situation." In England the words must be pre-
cisely contemporaneous with the act. R. v. Bedingfield. 14 Cox C. C. 34
(Eng. 1879). In America the rule is more liberal, as is illustrated by the
principal case. The utterance need not be strictly synchronous, but must
merely be made before there has been an opportunity to deliberate or to
fabricate some statement according to one's self-interest. Corn. v. Van Horn,
I88 Pa. 143 (1898). In Britton v. Power Co., 59 Wash. 44o (igo), where
a boy remained unconscious for eight days after a fall from a street car,
his statement, made at once upon becoming conscious, that the conductor
of the car kicked him off the steps, was held admissible as part of the res
gestae. According to the weight of authority, the declarant need not be a
participant in the transaction, but may be a mere bystander, provided of
course his statements relate only to what has come under his own observa-
tion. Cooper v. State, z38 S. W. Rep. 826 (Tenn. '9ti); Easley v. State, 159
S. IV. Rep. 36 (Ark. 1913). Nor need the declarant be one who would be
personally competent as a witness. In Grant v. State, j24 Ga. 757 (1906),
as in the principal case, the declarant was a child too young to testify. On
the other hand, to make the declaration admissible, it is not necessary to
show the death, absence, or other unavailability of the declarant. This has
never been disputed. Wigmore on Evidence (ed. 19o4), vol. 3, J174&
EVIDENCE-STATEMENT IN PRESENCE OF Accus--A statement made in
the presence of an accused person, even upon an occasion which should be
expected reasonably to call for some explanation or denial from him, is not
evidence against him of the facts stated save so far as he accepts the state-
ment, so as to"n ake it in effect his own. A mere denial by the accused of
the facts mentioned in the statement does not necessarily render the state-
inent inadmissible, although in such case its evidential value would be very
small and, in practice, the court would properly exercise its influence to
prevent such evidence being given. Director v. Christie, iii Law Times,
221 (Eng. 1914).
In the principal case, counsel for the accused argued that if the accused
denied the statement made in his presence, it should be inadmissible as a
matter of law for its affect upon the jury would be prejudicial to the prisoner
however carefully the judge might instruct the jury. Rex v. Norton, 2 K. B.
4S6 (9o), was cited to sustain this proposition but it does not seem to go
quite that far as it was said in that case, "It is, perhaps, too wide to say
that in no case can the statements be given in evidence when they are
denied by the prisoner." It may be stated as a general rule that statements
made to or in tbe presence of a person, accusing him of the commission or
complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against
him as warranting an inference of the truth of the statements. O'Hearn v.
State, 79 Neb. 5S5 (igo7); Gannon v. Metcalf, 127 ilL 507 (x889); People v.
Byrne, i6o Cal. 217 (i911). Contra to the principal case, the weight of
authority is that if the accused denies the statements, the 'whole occurrence
is incomplete as evidence against him as the whole ground for using it is
destroyed. State v. Swenson, 129 N. W. Rep. 119 (S. D. i9io); Brown v.
State, 65 S. WV. Rep. 401 (Miss. i9o); Merriweather v. Commonwealth, ui8
Ky. 870 (i9o4). But if the accused makes a reply wholly or partially admit-
ting the truth of the facts stated, both the statement and the reply are com-
petent evidence. Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 18o (t892). See
also 63 U. oF P. L R. 233.
INTRSTATE CoaMERCE -RECOVERY FOR OVERCHARGES-JURISDICTIoN-A
shipper brought suit against a carrier in a district court for making over-
charges in violation of the carrier's tariff schedules, filed and published under
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the Interstate Commerce Acts. Motion to dismiss the suit was made on the
ground that the court was without jurisdiction until the proper rates of
.charge, alleged to have been exceeded, had been interpreted by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Held: The motion must be disallowed. Under the
Acts of Congress in question it is optional with the complainant whether
he seek redress in the courts or before the Commission. Gimbel Bros., Inc.,
v. Barrett. 215 Fed. Rep. io4 (1914).
The point here involved is clearly covered by the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, which provides (Sec. 9) that one seeking redress under the Act
"must elect" whether he will proceed in the courts or before the Commission.
The Act also provides (Sec. 22) that the provisions of the Act are in addition
to the remedies existing at the common law. The fixing of rates by a com-
mission pursuant to the law creating the commission, has the same force as
if done by the legislature itself. Louisville, etc., R. R. v. Garrett, 231 U. S.
2A (1913). A deviation from such rates amounts to a discrimination and,
by the provisions of the Act, gives the interstate shipper the option of pro-
ceeding in the courts for his common law remedy, or of seeking redress before
the Commission.
In determining the reasonableness of the filed and published rates them-
selves, however, we do not find this choice of procedure. With certain well
defined exceptions-see I. C. C. v. U. P. R. R., 222 U. S. 541 (1912)-the
Interstate Commerce Commission is the only tribunal which can decide
whether a published rate is reasonable or not. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. Y.
Abiline Cotton Oil Co.. 2o4 U. S. 466 (1898). Nor will the courts pass on the
question of whether published rates are discriminatory, or whether there is
discrimination in service, etc., until such question has been passed on by the
Commission. B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481 (igog);
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1912). So also the application of pub-
lished rates to commodities not specifically listed is for the Commission.
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie CO., 234 U. S. 138 (1913).
INTERSTATE COMMERcE-SUBJECTS OF INTERSTATE COMMF.RCE-STOCKS AND
BONDs-A statute of Iowa, commonly termed the "Blue Sky Law", placed a
restriction upon the introduction into the state and sale therein of stocks and
bonds by the citizens of other states. Held: This law imposes a direct burden
upon interstate commerce and is therefore invalid and unconstitutional.
William R. Compton Co. v. Allen. 216 Fed. Rep. $37' (1914).
The general rule would seem to be that whatever is subject of barter and
sale, if employed in commerce with "foreign nations, between the states, or
with Indian tribes", is a part of interstate commerce and so subject to regu-
lation by Congress, free from substantial interference by the states. Con-
cerning the staple commodities employed in the ordinary commercial trans-
actions no doubt arises, but matters like that illustrated in the principal case
are close to the line. In the Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321 (1903), it was
decided that lottery tickets shipped from one state to another were part of
interstate commerce and subject to regulation as such. So also the text-
books, etc., used for courses of study under the direction of a correspondence
school are considered to be employed in interstate commerce. International
Text-book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 9T (9o9). So also an agency for the
solicitation of passengers for interstate journeys is engaged in interstate
commerce. lMcCall v. California, 36 U. S. 1o4 (i8go). Clearly in line
with these decisions is the decision in the principal case, which is directly
supported by one other recent decision. Alabama & N. 0. Trans. Co. v.
Doyle, 21o Fed. Rep. 173 (1914).
But not every business connected with commerce is commerce, and sub-
ject to regulation as such. One who deals in foreign bills of exchange is not
engaged in interstate commerce. Nathan Y. Louisiana, 8 How. 73 (U. S.
x85o). The same rule applies to commercial agencies, State v. Morgan, 159
U. S. 16 (1894); collection agencies, U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co, v.
Kentucky, 231 U. S. 394 (1913) ; the business of a live stock exchange, Hop-
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kins v. U. S., 171 U. S. 578 (1898); a cotton brokerage business dealing in
futures and options, Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 4o5 (19o7).
Since the case of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868), an insurance
policy has been held not to be a part of interstate commerce. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389 (igoo). Nor does the fact that the insur-
ance policies or other commercial instruments employed in the cases just
cited are transported through the mails operate to make the transaction a
part of interstate commerce. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231
U. S. 495 (1913).
PLEADING-OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE ox GROUND OF INSUFFICIENT STATl-
mENT-After pleading to the merits, the defendant objected to the introduc.
tion of any evidence "for the reason that the petition shows on its face that
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover". Held: The practice of objecting to
the introduction of any evidence in a cause on the ground that the com-
plaint does not state a cause of action is very objectionable. It is only when
the defect of the petition is of such a nature that it cannot be cured by the
verdict of the jury, that it is mot waived by pleading to the merits. United
Kansas Portland Cement Co. v. Harvey, 216 Fed. 316 (1914).
If a petition states a cause of action imperfectly or indefinitely, i. e.,
if it is merely defective in form, it is cured by pleading to the merits.
Laithe v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 254 (i87); Bell v. Railroad Co., 71 U. S. 598
(i866). Consequently, the weight of authority is that it cannot first be
taken advantage of at the trial by objecting to the admission of evidence.
American Bond & Investment Co. v. Hopkins, 1o4 Pac. Rep. io4o (Colo.
19o9); Robinson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 8o S. ,. Rep. 9 (Mo.
19o4). So, objection to the introduction of evidence on the ground that the
petition does not state a cause of action is equivalent to a demurrer to the
petition and cannot be used to raise the objection of the uncertainty of the
petition. Wey v. City Bank, 16 Pac. Rep. 143 (OkL i91I). It is only where
the petition, by omission of an essential averment, wholly fails to state any
cause of action that such objection to the introduction of any evidence may-
be made. Jones v. Philadelphia Insurance Co., 78 Mo. App. 296 (1899);
Consolidated Canal Co. v. Peters, 5 Ariz. 8o (1896). Similarly, it is not
error to rule out evidence tending to support a plea bad in substance. Oxford
Knitting Mills v. American W\'ringer Co., 6s S. E. Rep. 791 (Ga. 19o9). How-
ever, where the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged by an objection to
the admission of evidence, all intendments must be invoked in support of its
allegations. Brooks v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 114 Pac. Rep. 949 (Or. 1911).
PROPERTY-GiFTs INTER VIvos-CHosrs I- AcnoN-A valid gift of a
mortgage and note may be made inter zios without writing. Hoyt v. Gillen,
148 N. IV. Rep. 63 (Mich. 1914)..
All that is necessary to constitute a valid transfer of property inter
z-.os by parol is an expression to that effect by the donor accompanied by
a delivery of the thing to the donee. Choses in action are no exception to
the general rule. So in the case under discussion no written assignment of
the mortgage nor indorsement of the note in writing were necessary. Hoyt
v. Gillen. supra. So, a promissory note. Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. 66t
(Mass. 1832), may be made the subject of a valid parol gift without writ-
ing. Likewise a savings bank deposit book, Watson v. Watson, 69 Vt. 243
(i86) ; a policy of life insurance assignable to legal representatives, Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Grant, S4 N. J. Eq. 268 (086); a certificate of deposit, 143
Ill. App. 450 (igoS) ; certificates of stock, Brown v. Crofts, 98 Me. 40 (1903),
Com. v. Crompton, 173 Pa. 138 (i8go); a bond and mortgage, Hackney v.
Vrooman, 62 Barb. 65o N. Y. (1862).
Where a claim of a gift inter vivos is not asserted 'ntil after the death
of the donor, there must be clear and convincing proof that the subject of
the gift had passed by a valid and effective gift. Jones v. Falls, iol Mo.
App. .U6 (19o3); Thomas v. Tilby, 147 Ala. 189 (i9O6); In re Schroeder.
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186 X. Y. 537 (igo6). Where the evidence points to the creation of a trust,
the gift cannot be sustained. 89 App. Div. 400 (N. Y. 1903). But where
the donor and the donee reside in the same house as in the case of husband
and wife, or parent and child, it is not required that the thing given should
be removed from the common residence. Shepard.v. Shepard 164 Mich. 183
(igo). Nor is the gift annulled if the donee delivers it back into the pos-
session of the donor as where the donee of a promissory note handed it
back to the donor with the request that he keep it for him or collect it for
him. Grover v. Grover, jupra. Where a gift of stock has been fully exe-
cuted so as to transfer the legal title to the donee, the fact that the donor
retains the certificate in his possession is immaterial. Robert's Appeal, 85
Pa. 84 (1877).
SP.cnIC PERFORMANcE-REFUSAL OF WIFE TO Jor IN Daa---A purchaser
is not entitled to specific performance of a valid contract for the conveyance
of land from a husband whose wife refuses to join in the conveyance, with
either an abatement of the price pro tanto for the outstanding inchoate right
of dower, or to a decree requiring the seller to give indemnity against a
future claim of such a right. Long v. Chandler, 92 AtI. Rep. 256 (Del. 1914).
It is a general rule that if a vendor is unable to convey a good and unin-
cumbered title, according to his agreement, the vendee has a right to specific
performance with an abatement of the purchase price. Mortlock v. Buller,
io Ves. Jr. 292 (Eng. i8o4); Townsend v. Vanderworker, i6o U. S. 171
(1895); Lancaster v. Roberts, 144 I1. 213 (1893); Keator v. Brown, 57 N.
J. E. 6oo (i8gg); Napier v. Darlington, 70 Pa. 64 (1872). There is a conflict
of authority as to whether this rule applies to cases such as the one under
consideration. A decree for specific performance by the husband was ordered
with an abatement of fine in Woodbury v. Luddy, 96 Mass. 1 (1867); Noecker
v. Wallingford, 133 Iowa, 6o5 (19o7); Wright v. Young, 6 Wis. 127 (I8s6);
and also in Minnesota, Indiana, Michigan and Alabama. The objection to
such a decree is the impossibility to determine accurately the amount of the
abatement, because of the double contingency of the wife surviving the hus-
band. North Carolina deems the tables of mortality sufficient evidence of
the value of inchoate dower, Bethell v. McKinney, 164 N. C. 71 (1913), but
Illinois, New York, New Jersey, Oregon, Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Mis-
souri and the District of Columbia refuse to give such a decree. Bateman v.
Riley, 72 N. J. Eq. 316 (19o7); Riesz's Appeal, 73 Pa. 48s (1873); Cowan v.
Kane, 211 III. 575 (19o4). If there is fraud or collusion on part of the hus-
band in the refusal of the wife specific performance will be decreed, Riesz's
Ap., supra, Bateman v. Riley. supra. So also if the vendee is willing to pay full
purchase price for the husband's interest. Brown v. Ward, 110 Iowa, 123
(1898); Harrigan v. McAleese, 16 AtL R. 31 (Pa. 1888).
SV RYSHIP-JUDGMENT AGAINST PRINCIPAL-REs JUDICATA-A surety on
an administrator's bond is, though not a party to the proceedings, bound and
concluded by a judgment against his principal, in the absence of fraud or
collusion; the judgment against the principal is rets adjudicata and cannot be
collaterally attacked in an action on the bond. Pierce v. Maetzald, r48 N. W.
Rep. 302 (Minn. 1914).
The principal case is in accord with the majority view, Nevitt v. Wood-
burn, i6o Il1. 203 (1896), Allen v. Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409 (1912); that
sureties on administrator's bond, being privy to the proceedings against their
principal. Kenck v. Carchen, 22 Mont. 519 (x89g); are in the absence of fraud,
Gerould v. Wilson, 8i N. Y. 73 (1885); concluded by a decree of a probate
court as to principal's liability, Barney v. Babcock, ii5 Wis. 4o9 (igo2); even
though not actual parties to the accounting of principal, Yang's Est., i99
Pa. 35 (i9o1). Judgments against the administrators cannot be collaterally
attacked by the surety in an action on the bond, Bonnor v. Gorman, 77 S. W.
Rep. 602 (Ark. x903); the only defences being payment, Comm. v. Ruhl, igg
Pa. 40 (19o); removal of administrator before judgment was obtained,
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Bourne v. Todd, 63 Me. 427 (1874) ; Statute of Limitations, Dawes v. Shed,
15 Mass. 6 (818); want of jurisdiction, Browning v. Vanderhorn, 4 Abb. I66
(N. C. 1886) ; and inability of the estate to pay the debt, Griffin v. Justices,
22 Ga. 59o (1857). This doctrine does not apply where the surety has been
discharged by a secret agreement between the administrator and the dis-
tributecs of the estate, whereby the administrator may use the moneys of
the estate for his personal affairs. Brooks v. People, i5 Ill. App. 570 (1884).
In some jurisdictions a surety is not bound by a decree of the court on
final settlement of the account of administrators. Street v. Henry, 27 So.
Rep. 4II (Ala. i9oo); Creutz v. Artsman, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 422 (1887); Canal
Co. v. Brown, 4 La. Ann. 5.6 (1849). The rule in some jurisdictions is that
a judgment against an administrator is prima facie evidence against his
sureties, Bennett v. Graham, 71 Ga. 21r (1883), who can impeach it only by
proof of collusion or mistake, O'Connor v. State, 18 Ohio St. 225 (x868).
TORTS-LIAILITY FOR RUNAWAi TEAm-The owner of a team of horses
which runs away on the private premises of the owner is liable for injuries
caused by it to person on the highway only on proof of negligence. Briggs
v. Lake Auburn Crystal Ice Co., 92 Atd. Rep. 185 (Me. 1914).
At the common law an owner's liability for the escape of domestic
animals from his premises was absolute and it was not necessary to prove
negligence. Rust v. Low, 6 Mass. go (i8o); Wells v. Howell, i9 Johns, 385
(N. Y. 1822) ; Barber v. Mensch, 157 Pa. 390 (1893). The absurdity of this
view was pointed out by Cornish, J., in the course of his opinion in the
principal case: "It would make the milkman an insurer when he loads his
team in his own dooryard, but liable simply for negligence when his team
runs away while on the public street or in any other dooryard on his route."
Even in the case of other domestic animals the common law rule of absolute
liability has been considerably modified. In certain of the western states it
has been held inapplicable as not suited to local conditions. Merritt v. Hill,
1o4 Cal. 184 (1894) ; and in other states has been changed by statute or held
inconsistent with local legislation. Otis v. Morgan, 6i Ia. 712 (1883). In
Fallon v. O'Brien, 12 R. I. 518 (i88o), the rule was rejected as illogical. By
a rule based on practical necessity, there is no liability unless there be
negligence for the trespasses of cattle being driven along highways. Tillett v.
Ward, 1o Q. B. D. 17 (Eng. 1882).
ToRTs-RuiLE IN Rylands v. Fletchcr-ExPLosIVEs-A railroad car con-
taining dynamite was being unloaded on one of the railroad's piers in Jersey
City when it exploded and wrecked the libellant's vessel. There was no evi-
dence of negligence. Held: The railroad company is not liable. Actiesselskabct
Ingrid v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 216 Fed. Rep. 72 (914).
In this case the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 N. L. 33o (Eng.
i868), which has been accepted in Massachusetts, Wilson v. City of New
Bedford, ro8 Mass. 261 (1871), Shipley v. Fifty Associates, io6 Mass. 194
(1870); Ohio, Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's Woolen Mfg. Co., 6o
Ohio St. 56o (1899); Minnesota, Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872);
Berger v. Minneapolis Gas Light Co., 6o Minn. 296 (1895) ; and the District
of Columbia, Brennan Construction Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. D. C. SS4
(I9O7), was pressed on the court which, in an exhaustive resum6 of the
decisions in the United States, criticized the principal of absolute liability laid
down by the House of Lords when applied to the conditions existing in this
country. It was pointed out that the majority of jurisdictions in this country
have repudiated the English doctrine. Losee v. Buchanan, 5I N. Y. 476 (873) ;
Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 472 (1873); Marshall v. Wellwood, 38 N. J. Law
339 (1876) ; Jennings v. Davis, 187 Fed. 703 (1911).
However, regardless of the question as to whether the doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher, .supra, should be applied here, the facts of the principal case
come within two of the well recognized exceptions to the rule. As the court
pointed out, a common carrier is never liable in such a case as this without
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proof of negligence. Mr. Justice Blackburn clearly stated this in his opinion
in Rylands v. Fletcher, supro, when he said: "Traffic on the highways, whether
by land or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing those whose persons
or property are near it to some inevitable risk; and that being so, those
who go on the highway or have their property adjacent to it may well be
held to do so subject to their taking upon themselves the risk of inevitable
danger; . . . Therefore, they cannot recover without proof of want of
care or skill occasioning the accident." Moreover it is submitted that the
principal case comes within the exception of The Eastern and South African
Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Co. (i9o2), A. C. 481, which held that
there was no liability when the doing of the act which caused the injury was
authorized by statute. In this case the transportation of dynamite was not
an infringement of the powers conferred on the railroad by its charter.
Tors-RULE IN Rylands v. Fletcher-W.VAR MAINS-The cables of an
electric lighting company, placed underground by legislative authority, were
damaged by the bursting of high-pressure water mains, operated by an
hydraulic power company under similar statutory sanction. Held: Even
though it had not been guilty of any negligence, the hydraulic power com-
pany was liable for the damage done to the property of the electric com-
pany. Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co. v. London Hydraulic Power
Co., III L T. R. 198 (Eng. 1914).
By the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L 33o (Eng. x868), a
person who, for his own purpose, brings on his land, and keeps there, any-
thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it there at his peril, and
he is answerable, even if he be not negligent, for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape. Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115
(Eng. 1885). Though the authority of Rylands v. Fletcher is unquestioned
in England, there has been an apparent tendency to limit its application, Pont-
ing v. Noakes, 22 B. 28t (Eng. 1894), and juries have been practically em-
powered to mitigate the rule, whenever its operation seems too 'severe.
Nichols v. Marsland, L R. 2 Ex. Div. I (Eng. 1876). It has been held that
the escape of dangerous things brought upon one's land under legislative
authority does not render one liable, unless the damage was due to negli-
gence. Vaughan v. Taft Vale Rwy. Co., 5 H. & N. 67'9 (Eng. i86o); National
Telephone Co. v. Baker, 2 Ch. 186 (1893). The court in the principal case,
however, extends the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher to the case of co-users
of public property under statutory sanction, following Midwood v. Man-
chester Corporation, 2 K B. 597 (Eng. i9o5).
In American jurisdictions the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher has been the
subject of considerable discussion. In some states it has been adopted and
favored, Shipley v. Fifty Associates, io6 Mass. 194 (1870) ; Baltimore Brew-
eries Co. v. Ranstead, 28 Atd. Rep. 273 (Md. 1894); but in others it is
denied and repudiated. Losee v. Buchanan, sI N. Y. 476 (1873) ; Sanderson
v. Penna. Coal Co., 113 Pa. 126 (1886); Cumberland Telephone Co. v. United
Electric Co, 42 Fed. Rep. 273 (i89o). For a full discussion of this subject,
see Pollock's Torts (ed. 1912), pp. 497-507; "The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,"
59 U. oF P. L R. 289.
TRuSTs-CA .rON-PREEATORmY Woas-The residue of an estate was be-
queathed to a nephew with the words, "It is my desire that he shall distribute
the same among my nephews and nieces." Held: As the subject-matter and
the objects are sufficiently certain, the precatory words in the will created
a trust. In re Dewey's Estate, 143 Pac. Rep. IZ4 (Utah, 1914).
The court in the principal case follows the old doctrine that a trust
will be raised on precatory words, notwithstanding the fact that there was
an absolute gift, where the objects and subject of the supposed trust are
definite and certain. Eeles v. England, 2 Vern. 466 (Eng. g7o4); Malim v.
Keighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 333 (Eng. 1794). The reason for regarding desiderative
or hortatory expressions as manifestly implying an intention to create a trust
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was said to be that "the wish of a testator, like the request of a sovereign,
is equivalent to a command". Hill's Trustees (ed. j867), 73. Though this
view is occasionally adopted in more recent decisions, Murphy v. Carlin, i13
Mo. 112 (1892); Knox v. Knox, sg Wis. 172 (1884), the modern tendency in
England, as well as in the American jurisdictions, is to give less force than
formerly to such expressions. Stead v. Mellor, 5 Ch. D. 225 (Eng. 1877);
It re Oldfield, T Ch. 549 (Eng. 1904); Lumpkin v. Rodgers, 155 Ind. 285
(1goo). The Pennsylvania courts early repudiated the old rule, Pennock's
Estate, 20 Pa. 268 (6853), where the court said: "Words in a will expressive
of desire, recommendation, and confidence are not words of technical, but of
common parlance, and are not, prima facie, sufficient to convert a devise or
a bequest into a trust; and the old Roman and English rule on this subject
is not part of the common law of Pennsylvania." Accord: In re Bellas,
176 Pa. 172 (1896). The trend of modern authority is to regard precatory
words as insufficient to create a trust unless it is clearly shown that the tes-
tator actually intended them to be mandatory, using the terms as polite forms
of command rather than request. In re Conolly, I Ch. 219 (Eng. 91);
Fellows v. Durfey, 79 S. E. Rep. 621 (N. C. 1913).
For a full treatment of this subject see Jarman's Wills, vol. 1, §868
(ed. igio), and Perry's Trusts and Trustees, vol. 1, §112 (ed. 1911).
TRUSTS-ENFRCEMFNT-LAPSE OF TiME-Where one has been permitted
without question for nearly twenty years to hold the absolute title to prop-
erty as his own, a bill in equity alleging merely that the property was held
"in trust" and asking for a decree to enforce the trust, without stating any
facts to excuse the long delay, will be dismissed. Alexander v. Fidelity
Trust Co.. 2z5 Fed. Rep. 79T (r914).
In this case the plaintiff failed to specify whether the trust was express
or not. As a general rule, lapse of time in itself will not bar the ceitui
que trurst of an express or continuing trust of his rights as against the trustee.
Whetsler v. Sprague, 224 Ill. 461 (90o6) ; Anderson v. Fry, 102 N. Y. Supp.
112 (19o7). But even in such cases a court of equity may refuse to enforce
a trust on the ground of laches where the beneficiary, with actual or con-
structive knowledge of a breach of trust or an assertion of adverse title,
has inexcusably and unreasonably delayed asserting his rights. Maggini v.
Jones, 223 Pa. 301 (i9o9); Sawyer v. Cook, i88 Mass. 163 (i9o5). How-
ever, although laches may be set up against an express trust, courts of
equity apply the rule in such cases much less readily than in cases of con-
structive or resulting trusts. In the latter case, equity will refuse its aid
to stale demands, where a party has slept upon his rights, or has acquiesced
for a great length of time. Hughes v. Letcher, i68 Ala. 3T4 (191o); New-
man v. Newman, 6o W. Va. 17I (i9o6). Mere delay, however, will not con-
stitute laches, where there is a good excuse for the delay. Laughlin v.
Laughlin, 2T9 Pa. 629 (1907). But as shown in the principal case, the excuse
must be definitely set forth in the bill. Martin v. Martin, 74 Ad. Rep. 864
(Del. igoo). No general rule can be laid down as to what time constitutes
sufficient delay to bar the beneficiary on the ground of laches. The ten-
dency, however, is to act on the analogy of the Statute of Limitations, and
to use that as a guide. Dunn v. Dunn, 137 N. C. 533 (19o5); Merton v.
O'Brien, 117 Wis. 437 (1903). In some jurisdictions, as in Pennsylvania, a
special period of limitation within which an implied or resulting trust must
be enforced is expressly prescribed by statute. Cooper v. Cooper, 6z Miss.
676 (1884) ; Braun v. Church, 198 Pa. 152 (1901).
TRUSTS-TNTATIVE TRUSTS-DF.oSIT IN BAN -The deceased deposited
a sum of money in a bank "payable to self or George T. Pierce or Caroline
Dinsdale, an equal amount to each". Statements made by the deceased at
time of making the deposit and at other times showed that she intended to
use the interest of this money herself and leave the principal for George
and Caroline. Held: Such constituted the bank a trustee of the funds in
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favor of George and Caroline, who may enforce this trust. Boyle v. Dinsdale,
143 Pac. Rep. 136 (Utah. 1914).
This case follows the general rule that where money is deposited in a
bank in the name of another the beneficiary may claim the deposit after
the creator's death. Smith v. Savings Bank, 64 N. H. 228 (i886); In re
Totten, 179 N. Y. 112 (i9o4). By this deposit, a tentative trust is created,
revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime
by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the pass book
to the beneficiary, Stockert v. Savings Bank, 139 N. Y. Supp. 986 (1913);
and see 61 U. OF PA. L. R. 527 (1913). It is not necessary that the bene-
ficiary even know of the deposit until after the depositor's death, for a valid
trust can be created without the knowledge of the cestui qui trust. Merigan
v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321 (i9o3); Marshall v. Marshall, i6o S. W. Rep. 775
(Ky. 1913) ; 62 U. oF P. L R. 581 (1914).
A voluntary trust can be enforced by the beneficiary so long as it has
been executed and not revoked. Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., 1o3
N. E. Rep. 706 (N. Y. 1913); 62 U. oF P. L. R. 483 (1914)..
WORXMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY OCCURRING "IN THE COURSE OF" AND
ARISING "OuT O1" THE EMPLOYjtNT-A section hand in the employ of a rail-
road left his tool house and while walking along the tracks on his way home
to the noonday meal was struck b7 a train and killed. Held: There can be
no recovery under the Workmen s Compensation Act as injuries did not
arise "out of" and "in the course of" the employment. Hills v. Blair, 148
N. W. Rep. 244 (Mich. i914).
An injury is received in the course of employment when it comes while
the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. In re
Employer's Liability Corp., 102 N. E. Rep. 697 (Mass. 1913), it arises "out of"
the employment when it results from a risk incidental to the employment,
as distinguished from a risk common to all mankind. Pierce v. Provident
Co. [Igii], I K. B. 997 (Eng. 191i); Bryant v. Fissell, 86 AtI. Rep. 458
(N. J. 1913). A workman is in the course of his employment not only while
doing his actual service, but also while eating or resting on the master's
premises, Marshall v. S. S. Wild Rose f1o9], 2 K. B. 46 (Eng. i9o9), even
though the employment is for a limited number of hours, Blovelt v. Sawyer
[19o4], z K. B. 271 (Eni. 19o4); Clem v. Motor Co., x44 N. W. Rep. 848
(Mich. 1914). But if the servant during the working hours, even with the
master's permission, leaves the latter's premises for purpose of satisfying the
wants of nature, he is not in the course of the employment, Gilbert v. S. S.
Nizan 11910], 2 K. B. 555 (Eng. i9io); McKrill v. Howard & Jones, 2 B. W.
C. C. (Eng. igog). An employee is in the course of his employment, if to
relieve a call of nature, he goes to a part of the master's premises other
than that which is the scene of his duties, Jabriskil v. Ry. Co., 88 AtL Rep.
824 (N. J. 1013). See also 62 U. OF P. L. R. 428
In r Sundine. o. N. E. Rep. 433 (Mass. 1914), where an employee was
injured, after leaving the room in which she was employed to get her lunch,
upon a flight of stairs which were not under the control of the employer,
the court held that the injury arose "out of" and "in the course of" the
employment. At first glance that case appears not to be in accord with
the principal case nor with the English decisions; but it may be distin-
guished from those cases in so far as, in the Sundine case the stairs on
which the servant was injured afforded the only means of going to and from
the workroom and therefore the using of them was an incident to the em-.
ployment; while in the other cases the injured workman had several ways of
going to and from his work.
